The index includes information on scope, nature, and frequency of al Qaeda attacks, breadth of the al Qaeda network, and costs in a range of measures of efforts on both sides of this conflict; 2 Compilation of annual data from on composite measures reflected in the index to allow for analysis of successes and failures over time in this endeavor. Select findings from the project include: Overall, not only did the US not achieve outright success by its own measures, but in constructing an exceptional AQ it arguably empowered its enemy. The Arab and Western media reflect different ideas about the causes of the conflict and contrasting notions of success and failure.
English is not a former intelligence officer or national-security official, nor a self-styled foreign-policy expert. He is instead a distinguished historian, born in Northern Ireland and currently a professor at the University of St.
He has written four books on the Irish Republican Army and is very knowledgeable of the history and development of terrorist groups, primarily European ones. He is prone not only to ask questions, but also to try to answer them, having written in Terrorism: I found Does Terrorism Work?
I know quite a bit about the groups that English discusses, and I am also intimately familiar with the countermeasures that were employed to combat and eventually defeat them. English basically accepts the United Nations language on what constitutes terrorism, which is: He counsels a restrained response.
In coming to those conclusions he is far from alone. For example, he posits that terrorist leaders are not as a rule crazy. They are rational players in that they have well-defined political objectives that they seek to attain and that they explicitly lay out in their manifestos.
Terror is consequently best seen as a tool in a political process. The book examines in considerable detail the histories of these groups. It notes that an overwhelming percentage of Irishmen and Basques do not and never have embraced the violent agenda promoted by the IRA and ETA, meaning that any kind of terrorist political ascendancy would never have popular support.
And the groups have understood from the get-go that they would never defeat, say, the British Army or the Guardia Civil. English also observes that the existence of terrorist groups actually hampered the moves toward greater regional autonomy, as terrorism hardened existing government positions and tended to undermine the efforts being made by more moderate reformers.
In other words, Basque and Northern Irish autonomy would have come sooner without the distraction provided by the IRA and ETA—and change, when it did come, came in spite of the presence of these hostile armed groups, not because of it. Al-Qaeda likewise is not particularly popular in the Muslim world and has accomplished little more than empowering the existing Islamic governments to get even tougher with dissidents.
Netanyahu might not even exist without Hamas. One might also mention Hezbollah. The group scored a major tactical success when it blew up the U.
Indeed, the book describes in detail only two terrorist movements that plausibly were driving forces in bringing about real political change. The first was Palestine, where Jewish terrorists primarily associated with the Stern Gang, Irgun, and Haganah eventually compelled the British to hand over the problem to the United Nations, resulting in the creation of the state of Israel.
But even in those cases, English plausibly makes the case that the British or French could easily have crushed the terrorists, but were not motivated to make the effort, because both countries were retrenching militarily and politically post-World War II.
There was also very little popular support back at home for either war, which means that while terror may have accelerated the timetable for withdrawal, it was not a major factor in bringing it about.understanding terrorism is both acknowledging the moral outrage at terrorist acts, while at the same time trying to understand the rationale behind terrorism.
However, the violence of the second intifada and the political success of Hamas (a group dedicated to Israel's destruction) In fact, Pedahzur goes as far as to say that suicide terrorism succeeded where peace negotiations failed in encouraging withdrawal by Israelis from cities in the West Bank.
business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) headquartered at the University of Maryland for their cooperation on Any successful approach will need to deal effectively.
In a veiled attack on Pakistan, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj has told a meeting of the SAARC foreign ministers that the scourge of terrorism remains the single largest threat to peace.
The question before us this evening is whether terrorism is a threat to world peace. Obviously, if we look at how the world has changed in the last 18 months, the answer is a resounding "yes." There is still a debate in some quarters over exactly what constitutes terrorism, though many .